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The following is a written account of the Middlesex County 
Board of Supervisors meeting, held on Tuesday, July 5, 1983. 
The topic of discussion centered on a proposed county airport 
hazard ordinance. 
Mr. Handley: Mr. Ward has one item to discuss on the agenda. 
Mr. Ward: This is in reference to the public h~aring on 
Thursday night about the public ordinance for Hummel Field. 
There were some statements made about the discussion concerning 
the Commonwealth Attorney's office and the Attorney Generals 
office. My only report to that is from the inception, we have 
been working with John McCarthy, Assistant Attorney General, 
who has been dealing with this, and as I understand is very 
important in writing the Attorney Generals opinion. 
I have talked with John McCarthy, and another gentlemen 
who deals with county ordinances-! do not have his name with 
me. As I stated that night, as I have stated the last month or 
two its nothing cut and dry about this type of ordinance. I 
can't guarantee that if it goes to court it will be approved, 
and I can't guarantee that it will be shot down either. It 
depends on the opinion that we are being dealt with according 
to Mr. McCarthy wasn't so much I don't think he wrote it very 
ambiguously but he didn't really respond because he felt like 
it was a case by case determination. I was wondering when I 
actually had discussions with Mr. McCarthy after the other 
night I thought maybe I had made a mistake so I can't say any 
thing about it and I couldn't do anything else so I called John 
and discussed with John my best recollections of what took 
place at the meeting, of course I told· him that I had not had 
time to review the tapes and maybe there had been some things 
said that I could not remember or didn't get quite right be-
cause there was so much hollering and screaming. So I asked 
John was he willing to put something in writing. He was not 
:only willing to put it in writing, he worked late on Friday 
and had his secretary work late on Friday and then hand de-
livered it to the main post office so it would be here today. 
In fact, Mr. McCarthy had told me that if not for the fact that 
he had planned a vacation sometime in the future, he would have 
been here today to discuss this. Again this is his opinion it 
is not a formal opinion from the Attorney Generals Office which 
was not requested by you anyway. This was a request to do 
something in writing from the Attorney Generals·.Office. That 
what we have got, and I would be glad to read it to you. 
Dear Jimmy: 
You have inquired whether a recently proposed ordinance 
regulating the height of structures within a certain radius of 
a county's airport would, when ap~lied to an adjacent piece of 
residential property on which the erection of a windmill has 
~~ been proposed (though no construction has commenced) constitute 
an unconstitutional taking of property without Que process. You 
further informed me that in a recent meeting of the board of 
2 
2 
supervisors held, inter alia, to consider the ordinance in 
question an attorney for the landowner, speaking on the 
landowner's behalf, publicly conceded that erection of the 
windmill was sought for the-express purpose of forcing the 
county to make a decision on the airport's future location. 
Mr. Ward: And as I told John and some of you today, I have not 
gone back and listen to the tapes. But to the best of my 
recollection, was that this board was forced to make a decision 
on the airport. Charlie (Revere) told me .today that he thought 
somebody questioned our _integrity not integrity but 
responsibility whether you were being irresponsible or not for 
not making a decision. I thought thats when it came up when he 
said you all had to do something, that you had to press the 
issue. 
(Continuance of letter) 
(Already, of course, I had been informed that the FAA had 
issued a hazard determination with respect to the proposed 
windmill.) 
You also inquired as to whether the county has authority 
to enact such an ordinance. While legal scholars do differ on 
this questions, it is my opinion that the better view is that 
the counties do have authority to enact such an ordinance in 
the interests of the safety of their citizens. At you earlier 
request, the ordinance was reviewed by myself and a colleague 
and in its current, reviewed form was not found to be 
objectionable. 
Mr. Ward: He reiterated there, the way I feel, what I said to 
you. This is his opinion (McCarthy). Everybody's got a 
·.different opinion, like Charlie (Revere) was talking about at 
· the end of the meeting where he upheld the fact that they filed 
an application would it have an affect? Yes, that someone's 
opinion and Charlie (Revere) said everyone has an opinion. 
This was to support not so much, the advocacy of the ordinance, 
but what I had told you that my conversation had been with 
these people. 
(Continuance of letter) 
Returning to the factual situation you now present, it 
appears from the statement made by counsel for the landowner 
that erection of the windmill is proposed for a purpose of 
remote to the economically viable use of the property itself 
and, instead, is proposed for the express purpose of forcing a 
political decision. In not entirely dissimilar contexts cases 
have held that one who erects a structure in proximity to an 
airport for the spiteful purpose of interfering with airport 
operations lacks the proper standing to challenge an ordinance 
prohibiting, inter alia, such a structure. While I could 
not on the facts given-me along conclude that spite was the 





still appears sufficiently akin to those in the cases referred 
to to dictate the same result. Accordingly, I am of the 
opinion that the landowner in question, having decided to erect 
the windmill for a purpose remote to any apparent concern for 
the economically viable use of his land, would lack standing to 
challenge the ordinance's application to the proposed windmill. 
In general terms, whether application of a zoning 
ordinance to a particular structure constitutes a taking of 
property without due process .involves a balancing test. The 
two factors to be weighted are the public's valid interests and 
the landowner's interests in the economically viable uses of 
his land. The public interests are in the health, safety, and 
welfare of its citizens. Inasmuch, as the FAA has formally 
determined that such a structure would constitute a hazard to 
aviation, the public's interest in safety must weigh heavily 
indeed. On the other hand, the landowner's concession through 
counsel in this instance would indicate that the economically 
viable uses of the land are not genuinely involved. 
The mere fact that the ordinance limits in some degree the 
development of the land does not make its application 
unconstitutional where it does not restrict the best use of the 
land or destroy any of the more fundamental incidents of 
ownership • 
As you have informed your board, there may, of course, 
arise other situations where you would determine that, absent 
just compensation, the ordinance could not bar the erection of 
certain structures whose erection is sought in accordance with 
the genuine desire to develop land for its highest and best 
use. 
Trusting this is responsive to your inquiry, I am with 
.- best wishes, 
Sincerely, 
John McCarthy 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mr. Ward: He dictated that and sent it to the trial. It does 
not change anything that I told you previously about the 
ordinance itself one way or another. If I could say there was 
no questions with the ordinance, I would. Just like this 
gentlemen said the other night, that positively if it couldn't 
be done he wouldn't be done anyway. As far as the ordinance is 
concerned, this is the opinion of Mr. McCarthy's letter. It is 
not a formal opinion of the Attorney General's Office. You 
know what happened on land use, when Judge Holiday and somebody 
was talking about the Attorney General's opinion, Judge Holiday 





Mr. Handley: It is my understanding, Dale, correct me if I am 
·Wrong, we had the public hearing at the June 3S meeting. The 
motion was that we could take this matter up when we received 
correspondence from the Assistant Attorney General. So with 
that we could bring this up and discuss it today. 
Mr. Burton: Right. 
Mr. Handley: Is it the feeling of the board to bring this up 
for discussion today to further discuss the proposed airport 
hazard ordinance. 
Mr. Jessie: Does the board have to pass the ordinance? 
Mr. Handley: We can, if you so desire. 
Mr. Jessie: I say lets discuss it and get this hazard 
ordinance out of the way, so another hazard won't come up. 
Mr. Revere: The original intent was that, and I think that 
time as we discussed the other night was a factor. The fact 
that I think we have a hearing next Friday, do you not? 
Mr. Crittenden: No, this Friday. 
Mr. Revere: I think maybe Fred made the motion ••• 
Mr. Crittenden: My motion at that me~ting was that we should 
have something in writing from t~e Attorney General's Office, 
and this is what Mr. Ward has gotten done. I think that 
answers the questions that I surfaced, and motion was passed at 
that time. · 
Mr. Handley: It cleared up some questions. 
Mr. Crittenden: This is exactly right. 
Mr. Ward: There were some questions that had not been 
resolved and will not be resolved until after ••• 
Not only that, but I would like to review the tapes and speak 
to Mr. McCarthy about things we never had a ch~nce to see 
about. 
Mr. Revere: That doesn't have any effect on the ordinance 
itself. 
Mr. Handley: All we are addressing right now is the ordinance. 
Whatever happened at that meeting we are not addressing at this 
time. That's up to Jimmy. 
Mr. Crittenden: I know Jimmy told us this, but at the time 
Jimmy didn't have information at the time, but I was concerned 
·: about the fact, particularly after listening to the gentlemen 
-J 




who spoke representing the people in the airport area, that 
maybe from their indication we shouldn't do it. But now we 
have this in writing, it is certainly wide open, as I see it. 
Mr. Ward: I think the only thing this has resolved is the 
issue that will be or could be signed by the board. 
Mr. Crittenden: Yes. 
Mr. Ward: And it appears, based on a certain set or 
circumstances we could go either way. 
Mr. Crittenden: The same t~ing could come up ••• 
Mr. Revere: And actually I think that was talking about 
responsibility that we were not acting responsively to 
something that had already been decided as far as what this 
~gentlemen concerns were. But thats why we have courts and ••• 
Mr. Ward: According to what Mr. McCarthy said he did remember 
that. He thought was not done ambiguously so much, but done in 
a context that it had to be decided on the facts of the issue. 
Thats what he stated right here he could see situations where 
this may not be found to be ••• okay. And the only other 
determination we are ever going to find out is not from Mr. 
Bailes's opinion as_ to what something is, but when the judge 
makes a decision. 
Mr. Handley: Thats something we have no control over. We have 
to do what we think is the best interest for all citizens of 
the county. 
Mr. Revere: It all boils down to whats in the best interest of 
:the public safety in this particular interest. 
Mr.- Ward: Do you all have on record what you thought was 
necessary to keep the airport as safe as possible. 
Mr. Handley: We had quite a lengthly discussion last Thursday 
on this do you wish to continue this discussion or do you wish 
to make a motion on this matter now. I think we have just 
about answered all the que~tions on this matter ~ow. 
Mr. Jessie: I make a motion to pass the ordinance now. 
Mr. Revere: Second. 






~ AN , ORDINANCE TO REGULATE THE CONSTRUCTION 1 ERECTION OR 
INSTALLATION OF HAZARDOUS STRUCTURES IN THE VICINITY OF HUMMEL 
PIELD, PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 15.1-584, 15.1-585, and 15.1-518 OF 
THE CODE OF VIRGINIA OF 1958, AS AMENDED. 
BE IT ORDAINED by the Board of Supervisors of Middlesex 
County, Virginia as follows: 
Section 1 Short Title. This ordinance shall be known and 
may be cited as the Middlesex County Airport Hazard Ordinance. 
Section 2 Policy and Purpose. It is hereby found that an 
obstruction has the potential for endangering the lives and 
property of users of Hummel Field, and the lives and property 
of occupants of land in its vicinity; that an obstruction may 
affect existing and future use and operation of Hummel Field; 
and that an obstruction may reduce the size of areas available 
for landing, take-off, and manuevering of aircraft, thus 
tending to destroy or impair the utility of Hummel Field and 
the public investment therein. Accordingly, it is declared: 
1. That the creation or establishment of a hazardous 
structure has the potential of being a public nuisance 
and may injure the region served by Hummel Field; 
2. That it is necessary in the interest of public health, 
public safety, and general welfare that the creation 
or establishment of hazardous structures be prevented; 
and 
3. That the prevention of those obstructions should be 
accomplished by the exercise qf the police power; and 
the immediate operation 9f the provisions of this 
ordinance is necessary for the protection and 
preservation of public health, public safety, and 
general welfare. 
Section 3 Definitions. As used in' this ordinance, unless 
the context requ1res otherwise, the following words and terms 
shall have the meanings indicated: 
HUMMEL FIELD: The airport located at Topping in Saluda 
Magisterial District, Middlesex County, Virginia, owned and 
operated by the County of Middlesex, Virginia. 
STRUCTURE: An object, including a mobile object, constructed, 
erected, or installed by man, including, without limitations, 
buildings, towers, windmills, cranes, and smoke stacks. 
HAZARDOUS STRUCTURE: Any structure ~hich by virtue of its 
height, design, or location is determined by the Federal 
Aviation Administration to constitute an obstruction to air 
navigation under Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 77. 
7 
4 I 
NONCONFORMING USE: Any pre-existing structure· which is 
inconsistent with the provisions of this ordinance. 
Section 4 Regulation Against Hazardous Structures. Except 
as otherwise provided In this ordinance, no hazardous structure 
shall be constructed, erected, installed, or permitted within 
an e i g h t- tenths ( 0 • 8 ) of a m i 1 e r ad ius of H u mme 1 Fie 1 d , 
measured from the cent7r point of the runway. 
Section 5 Nonconforming Uses. This ordinance shall not be 
construed to require the removal, lowering, or other altering 
of any structure in existence as of the effective date of this 
ordinance. 
Section 6 Enforcement. In addition to, and not in 
limitation of, the Board of Supervisors of Middlesex County may 
institute any action or proceedings which it deems appropriate 
to enjoin, prevent, or restrain any construction, erection, or 
any installation of a hazardous structure in violation of this 
ordinance. 
Section 7 Penalties. Any violation of this ordinance shall 
constitute a misdemeanor and be punishable by a fine of not 
more than five hundred dollars ($5~0.00) or imprisonment for 
not more than twelve (12) months, or both. Each day of 
. , violation continuing to exist shall constitute a separate 
offense. 
• s 
Section .8 Severability. If any court of competent 
jurisdiction shall adjudge any provision. of this ordinance 
to be i nva 1 i d, such judgement shall not af feet any other 
provision of this ordinance not included in the judgement. If 
any court of competent jurisdiction shall adjudge invalid the 
application of any provision of this ordinance to a particular 
structure, such judgement shall not affect the application of 
. -the provision to any other structure not specifically included 
in the judgement. 
Section 9 Effecitve Date. This ordinance shall be in full 
force and effect from and after its adoption by the Middlesex 
County Board of Supervisors • 
3 
COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA 
JAMES H. W A.RD, JR. 
COHHONWEA.LTH'S ATTORNEY 
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX 
POST .OFFICE BOX 356 
SALUDA. VIRGINIA 23149 
(804) 758-!5391 
July 18, 1983 
Mr. Randolph Reed 
Building Inspector 
Middlesex County 
Saluda, Va. 23149 
RE: Appeal Case 83-4, Mr. & Mrs. L. T. Nuckols, Jr. 
v. Middlesex County Board of Building Appeals 
Dear Randy: 
Even though the State Building Code Technical Board has 
reversed the decision made by our local Board of Appeals and 
yourself as to the above caption~u, I do not feel you should 
issue a building permit for the following reasons: 
1. As instructed by the Board of Supervisors of this 
County, I am to consider appealing the decision in the local 
Circuit Court as well as any other possible legal remedies; 
2. To grant such a permit would be.in violation of the 
recently enacted ordinance to regulate the construction. erect-
ion, or installation of hazardous structures in the vicinity of 
Hummel Airport. · 
If you have any questions relative to this :matter, please 
do not hesitate to contact me. 
With best regards, 




P. 0. Box 423 
{nnnty nf Bliddltstx 
Saluda, Virginia 23149 
(804) 758·4305 July 19, 1983 
.. 
~~. L. T. Nuckols 
Topping, Virginia 23169 
Dear Mr. Nuckols: 
In reference to your request for a permit to construct 
a windmill on your property at Topping near the Airport. 
I have been instructed by the Commonwealth's Attorney 
that the structure would be in violation of the County's 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
LUNSFORD T. NUCKOLS, JR. 
and 
ELIZABETH S. NUCKOLS 
P. 0. Box 101 A 
Topping, Virginia 23169 
MARSHALL D. BEARD 
and 
NANCY M. BEARD 
P. 0. Box 112 
Topping, Virginia 23169 
and 
BERNARD L. FLETCHER 
and 
PANSY M. FLETCHER 
Box 87 
Topping, Virginia 23169 
Complainants 
v. 
WILLIAM FOSTER, Successor to 
RANDOLPH REED 




BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY, to wit: 
A.CARLSON HANDLEY, JR. 
DAVIDSON J. GILL 
FRED S. CRITTENDEN 










f41DDLESEX CO.,\ P. 
FlLED 
1/- /¥-8>3 Op~}4 
In Chancery No. 2276 
AMENDED PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
[OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING 
FROM THE IMPROPER TAKING OF PETITIONERS' PROPERTY] 
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT: 
JURISDICTION 






ministerial act by a public official, to wit the issuance of a 
building permit. Jurisdiction for this action is conferred on 
the court by Section 17-123, and Section 8.01-184, et seq., 
Code of Virginia, 1950 as amended. Complainants are without 
any adequate remedy at law. Complainants are similarly agrieved 
by the action of defendants, and thus joinder is proper. In 
the event that mandamus is denied, complainants seek damages 
for the resulting taking and/or damaging of their property. 
PARTIES 
1. (a) Lunsford T. Nuckols, Jr. and Elizabeth S. Nuckols, 
husband and wife, (hereinafter Nuckols) are the owners of that 
certain parcel of real estate located in Pinetop Magisterial 
District, Middlesex County, Virginia, near Topping, Virginia, 
lying on Meacham's Creek, containing ·24.67 acres, more or less, 
which was acquired by deed duly recorded in the Clerk's office 
of said county on May 13, 1971. For further description, 
reference is made to said deed. 
(b) Marshall D. Beard and Nancy M. Beard, husband 
and wife (hereinafter Beard) are the owners of that certain 
parcel of real estate located in Pinetop Magisterial District, 
Middlesex County, Virginia, near Locklies, Virginia containing 
16.75 acres, more or less, which was acquired by deed duly 
recorded in the Clerk's office of s~id county on May 22, 1972. 





(c) Bernard L. Fletcher and Pansy M. Fletcher, 
husband and wife (hereinafter Fletcher), are the owne~s of that 
certain parcel of real estate located in Pinetop Magisterial 
District, Middlesex County, Virginia, near Topping, Virginia, 
containing 8.00 acres, more or less, which was acquired by 
deed duly recorded in the clerk's office of said county on 
August 1, 1967. For further description, reference is made 
to said deed. 
2. At all times material herein, Randolph Reed, (herein-
after Reed) was the duly appointed, qualified and acting Building 
Official in the County of Middlesex, Virginia, representing the 
Local Building Department as that term is defined in Section 
36-97(10) of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended [Uniform 
Statewide Building Code] (hereafter Building Code). Reed resigned 
as the Building Official on September 30, 1983. His current 
successor in office is William Foster, Acting Building Official. 
3. Board of 'supervisors of Middlesex County (hereinafter 
Board) is the duly elected governing body of Middlesex County, 
Virginia. The members are A. Carl Handley, Jr., Davidson J. 
Gill, Fred s. Crittenden, Charles R. Revere and Frank Jessie. 
EXHIBITS 
All exhibits referred to herein are attached to the 
original petition filed August 11, 1983, and are incorporated 




(COMPLAINANTS' VESTED RIGHTS) 
4. Pursuant to the Building Code the Building Official 
(formerly Reed, now Foster) is authorized and charged with the 
duty and task of issuing building permits upon application for 
such permit properly made and presented to him in his official 
capacity. Such permit is "properly made" when it is 
1. typed or printed on the form provided to applicants 
by the Building Official. 
2. accompanied by a set of building or structure 
plans that indicate that the proposed building or structure 
conforms to the Building Officials and Code Administrators 
[BOCA] Code. 
3. accompanied with a check for the application fee 
(or other credit arrangements are made with the Building 
Official for payment of the fee) • 
5. (a) On or about February 4, 1983, Nuckols submitted 
to Reed an application for a permit to erect a new structure on 
their property, to wit, a tower to support a wind generated 
turbine (windmill). Said application was made on the form 
furnished by Reed, and was "properly made." The application was 
accompanied by a working plan, and specifications as required, 
all of which indicated that the proposed structure complied 
with the BOCA Code. A copy of Nuckols' application i& attached 
hereto and marked Exhibit l(a). 




to Reed an application for a permit to erect a new structure on 
·their property, to wit, a tower to support a wind gen~rated 
turbine (windmill). Said application was made on the form 
furnished by Reed, and was "properly made." The application was 
accompanied by a working plan, and specificiations as required, 
all of which indicated that the proposed structure complied with 
the BOCA Code. A copy of Beard's application is attached hereto 
and marked Exhibit l(b). 
(c) On or about February 22, 1983, Fletcher submitted 
to Reed an application for a permit to erect a new structure on 
their property, to wit, a tower to support a wind generated 
turbine (windmill). Said application was made on the form 
furnished by Reed, and was "properly made." The application was 
accompanied by a working plan, and specifications as required, 
all of which indicated that the proposed structure complied with 
the BOCA Code. A copy of Fletcher's application is attached 
hereto and marked Exhibit l(c). 
6. (a) On April 13, 1983, Reed DENIED Nuckols' application. 
A copy of Reed's letter of denial is attached as Exhibit 2(a). 
(b) On June 16, 1983 Reed DENIED Beard's application. 
A copy of Reed's letter of denial is attached as Exhibit 2(b). 
(c) On June 23, 1983 Reed DENIED Fletcher's 
application. A copy of Reed's letter of denial is attached as 
Exhibit 2(c). 
7. Reed's reason for the denials was not based on 
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applications were filed there were no zoning or other public 
or private restrictions that would be violated by the.erection 
of such structures (windmills) as described by said applications 
and plans. At the time said applications were filed, there were 
no violations or contemplated violations of any Building Code 
requirements or of any other ordinances or lawful requirements of 
said County in connection with the erection and maintenance of 
such structures. 
8. Nuckols appealed the denial to the Local Building Code 
Board of Appeals on March 28, 1983, as prescribed by §118.7 of 
the Building Code. See letter and memorandum in support of 
appeal with exhibits attached as Exhibit 3(a) and 3(b). (Because 
of Reed's inactions and letter dated February 22, 1983, a copy 
of which is attached as Exhibit 3(c), Nuckols' notice of appeal 
was filed before Reed's letter of de~ial (Exhibit 2(a)) was 
received.) 
9. On April 13, 1983, the Local Building Appeals Board 
conducted a hearing on Nuckols appeal and denied the appeal. See 
minutes of Middlesex County Appeals Board attached as Exhibit 4. 
10. On April 14, 1983 Nuckols appealed the decision of 
the Middlesex County Board of Building Appeals to the State 
Building Code Technical Review Board (hereinafter State Board) . 
See letter dated April 14, 1983 attached as Exhibit 5. The 
review by the State Board represented the final administrative 
procedure in such matters. 





Nuckols' appeal for May 20, 1983. See letter dated May 3, 
1983 attached as Exhibit 6(a). On May 17, 1983, at the request 
of the Commonwealth Attorney of Middlesex County, counsel for 
Reed, the hearing was continued. See ~etter attached as 
Exhibit 6(b). The hearing on the appeal was rescheduled for 
July 8, 1983. See letter attached as Exhibit 6(c). 
12. Sometime before the July 8 hearing, to wit, 
June 16, 1983 and July 5, 1983 respectively, Beard and Fletcher 
contacted Reed by letter and notified Reed that they intended 
to appeal the denial of their application for a permit. See 
Exhibits 7(a) and 7(b). On June 21, 1983, Reed responded to 
Beard by referring Beard to the Nuckols appeal and requested that 
Beard defer his appeal to the local Board since there was an 
appeal pending before the State Board identical to Beard's 
application, and stated that he (Reed) would "abide by their 
. 
decision." See letter dated June 21, 1983 at~ached as 
Exhibit 7(c). It is submitted that Reed would have responded 
in a similar fashion to Fletcher if time permitted. 
13. Nuckols' appeal was heard by the State Board on 
July 8, 1983 and the decision of the Middlesex County Board 
of Building Code Appeal was REVERSED, effective July 8, 1983. 
See Opinion dated July 13, 1983, attached as Exhibit 8. This 
decision has the effect of a directive to the Building Official 
to issue the permit. 




Fletcher requested Reed to issue the permits for which they 
had previously applied. Reed refused to do so. See letters 
dated July 19 and 20, 1983 attached as Exhibits 9(a) 9(b) and 
9 (c) • 
15. Reed's stated basis for refusing to issue the permits 
is that the Commonwealth Attorney notified him that, in his 
opinion, a new County Ordinance enacted on the eve of the hearing 
before the State Board (July 5) precluded such action. See 
letter from Ward to Reed dated July 18, 1983 attached as 
Exhibit lO(a) and copy of Ordinance attached as Exhibit lO(b). 
However, complainants' applications were filed approximately 
five months before the instant ordinance was enacted, and they 
had performed all required tasks, and complied with all the 
legislative requirements for the procurement of such permits. 
But for the improper refusal of the Building Official to issue 
the permits, the structures would have been erected prior to 
the enactment of the ordinance. The ordinance itself recog-
nizes that pre-existing structures are exempt from its 
authority. Section five of the ordinance states: 
This ordinance shall not be construed to require 
the removal, lowering, or other altering of any 
structure in existence as of the effective date of 
this ordinance. 
lS(a). Nuckols, Beard, and Fletcher have made demands 
upon the Board of Supervisors of Middlesex County to not enact 
the questioned ordinance because it was invalid and otherwise 





on their land, as well as other demands for compensation as 
required by Va. Code §15.1-554. 
16. Complainants submitted their applications for building 
permits with bona fide site plans a~d have diligently pursued 
their remedies in good faith, incurring substantial expenses 
in preparing plans for· their respective structures, including 
but not limited to architectural and engineering fees, 
contractors• expenses for on site work as well as stand~by 
fees, and legal and other expenses. In addition, complainants 
have incurred substantial legal expenses in pursuing and 
exhausting their administrative remedies through the various 
appeals described herein . 
17. Because of the above described actions, complainants 
have acquired vested rights to the building permits described 
in the applications properly filed, notwithstanding the sub-
sequently enacted ordinance. That is, for purposes of 
construing section five of the ordinance, complainants are in 
the position of having the structures in question legally 
"in existance ... Any delay in carrying out the intention of 
complainants to erect said structure will cause further expense. 
18. Complainants are without a plain and adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of law to secure the issuance of such 
permits, and cannot lawfully proceed to erect said structures 
without such permits; the Building Official (now Foster) refuses 
and withholds the issuance of such permits in violation of his 
legal duty as hereinbefore set forth, and to the great injury 




--~------·--~- T"" .. - .. - •• 
10 
WHEREFORE, complainants pray that this court take juris-
diction under the Declaratory Judgment Section of the Code of 
Virginia and under its inherent equity powers; that it determine 
the rights of the complainants and determine that complainants 
have a vested right to their respective building permits and 
issue a writ of mandamus to defendant Foster, Reed's successor 
in office, or his successor, to issue or cause issuance to 
complainants of their respective building permits, and if 
a writ to show cause is issued, that then, on final hearing, 
an order be made that such building permits be issued 
and complainants further pray that they be awarded their 
attorneys' fees, court costs, and such other and further 
relief as to the court may seem just and proper. 
COUNT II 
[INVALI~ITY OF ORDINANCE ENACTED JULY 5, 1983] 
In the event that complainants vested rights are not 
recognized then, pleading in the alternative, complainants 
allege that the ordinance is invalid and in support, represent 
as follows: 
A. 
19. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 16 are 
incorporated herein by reference as if stated fully. 
20. The ordinance in question (Exhibit lO(b)) was 
originally proposed and noticed for a public hearing at the 





the validity of the ordinance was questioned by several persons 
in attendance, including one of the attorneys for complainants 
herein. As a result, the Board lay on the table ("tabled") 
generally any further consideration of the proposed ordinance, 
and directed the Commonwealth Attorney to secure an opinion 
from the Attorney General of Virginia on the validity of the 
proposed ordinance. No date was set for further consideration 
of the ordinance. In fact, the Commonwealth Attorney publicly 
stated that he did not see any way he could get an opinion from 
the Attorney General before July 8, 1983, the date set for the 
Appeal before the State Board. 
21. On July 1, 1983 the Commonwealth Attorney contacted 
one of the Assistant Attorney Generals, ~ parte, and requested 
a letter from him on the validity of the proposed ordinance. 
22. On July 5, 1983, without. ~urther notice to the public, 
the Board enacted the ordinance which is attached as 
Exhibit lO(b). The action of the Board in passing the ordinance 
should be declared null and void and the ordinance invalid for 
failure to reasonably provide fair and adequate notice to the 
public. The concerned citizens relied on the statements and 
information publicly stated at the June 30, 1983 meeting such 
that they were taken by complete surprise when the Board 
considered this ordinance at its meeting on July s~ The Board 
considered and voted on the ordinance at its meeting on July 5, 




to vote on the proposed ordinance, in order to thwart the 
interests of the public including complainants herein. 
B. 
23. Virginia follows the "Dillon Rule," which requires 
that no county or municipality may enact any legislation unless 
there is specific statutory authority for same. 
24. The ordinance states on its face that the authority for 
its enactment is Section 15.1-504, 15.1-505 and 15.1-510, 
Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended (Code). Section 15.1-504 is a 
general grant of power to counties prescribing the procedure 
to be followed in the adoption of ordinances, and Section 15.1-505 
establishes the penalty for the violation of any such ordinance. 
Section 15.1-510 is a grant by the Virginia General Assembly 
to any county in Virginia to the right to exercise certain 
police powers. 
25. Notwithstanding the attempt by the Board to label the 
ordinance an exercise of its police powers, the ordinance is a 
zoning ordinance. As such, it must be enacted in compliance 
with Sections 15.1-486 et seq. of the Code. 
26. The Board failed to comply with the procedural 
requirements of the Code in enacting the ordinance. Furthermore, 
the ordinance is an attempt to spot zone or zone a specific 
section of the county, in violation of statutory and constitu-
tional constraintb. 
27. The action of the Board of Supervisors in zoning said 




it had no relationship to the health, safety, and welfare of the 
county; the sole reason for enacting a zoning law was to 
prevent the issuance of building permits to complainants for a 
windmill. 
28. The defendants, in denying complainants' applications 
are improperly relying on an invalid ordinance. As a zoning 
ordinance, it was enacted improperly and is thus illegal; as 
an exercise of police power, it is arbitrary and capricious 
and likewise illegal. 
29. Complainants are without a plain and adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of law to secure the issuance of such 
permits, and cannot lawfully proceed to erect· said structures 
without such permits; the Building Official (now Foster) refuses 
and withholds the issuance of such permits in violation of his 
legal duty as hereinbefore set forth, and to the great injury 
and damage to complainants. 
WHEREFORE, pleading in the alternative, complainants pray 
that this court take jurisdiction under the Declaratory 
Judgment Section of the Code of Virginia and under the inherent 
equity powers; that it determine the rights of the complainants 
and that it determine that the ordinance passed on July 5, 1983 
was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the proper 
procedures for zoning legislation and lacking in due process 
notification to the public and therefore null and void ab 
initio, and that it further determine that said action insofar 





was null and void and contrary to the Constitution of Virginia 
and of the United States of America, and that it issue such 
writs, orders or injunctions as may be necessary to carry out 
its findings and specifically that it direct the issuance of 
building permits to complainants in accordance with law: and 
that they be awarded their attorneys' fees, court costs, and 
such other relief as to the court may seem just and proper. 
COUNT III 
Pleading in the alternative, complainants allege 
30. The allegations of paragraphs 1-29 are incorporated 
herein by reference as if stated fully 
31. In the event that this court (a) upholds the validity 
of the ordinance (Exhibit lO(b) and (b) denies that complainants 
have a vested right to their respective building permits, 
complainants' property will have effectively been taken and 
or damaged by Middlesex County. Any such taking or damaging 
when done for "the public use" must provide the property 
owners affected with just compensation. Art. 1, Sec. 11, 
Virginia Constitution. 
32. The stated purpose of the ordinance is for the use 
and benefit of the public. 
33. The Board has not provided complainants with any 
compensation for the taking or damaging of their property for 
public use. 






the Board has taken or damaged their respective properties and 
schedule a hearing to determine the amount of damages.to be 
awarded along with their attorneys' fees and costs and such 
other and further relief as to the court seems just. 
./ 
. ;;.._,,. .... 
. /: /·"\ _, 
/ .... ~~ ·i -c. ct· </: C c. c.t '- t·vfJ· ) 
William B. Cummings, E~uire 
112 South Pitt Street ~~ 
Post Office Box 1177 
Alexandria, Virginia 22313 
(703) 836-7997 
and 
LUNSFORD T. NUCKOLS 
ELIZABETH S. NUCKOLS 
MARSHALL D. BEARD 
NANCY M. BEARD 
BERNARD L. FLETCHER 
PANSY L. FLETCHER 
/ .- .I hi G/ 
,- I .. ,• t' {','": (..('~.~ Z:~ 1%11~. ~l~· ;.:0, "t.; ·; (_ 
-conrad B. Maddox, Jr. ,;:,Esquire 
309 Marston Lane ,, 
Richmond, Virginia 23221 
(804) 353-5176 
Counsel for Complainants 
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STATE OF VIRGINIA 
CITY/COUNTY OF 
16 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this date by LUNSFORD T. 
NUCKOLS, JR. and ELIZABETH S. NUCKOLS. 
Date: 
My commission expires: 
STATE OF VIRGINIA 
CITY/COUNTY OF 
Notary Publ~c 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this date by MARSHALL D. 
BEARD and NANCY M. BEARD. 
Date: 
My commission expires: 
STATE OF VIRGINIA 
CITY/COUNTY OF 
Notary Public 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this date by BERNAND L. 
FLETCHER and PANSY M. FLETCHER. 
Date: 
Notary Public 
l-iy commission expires: 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing amended 
petition was hand delivered/mailed first class postage prepaid, 
this day of November, 1983 to James H. Ward, Jr., Esquire, 
Post Office Box 356, Saluda, Virginia 23149, Counsel for defendants • 
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~H THE CIRCUIT :COI!RT OF ~IDDLESEX C:0~~-7:.::·. ~.·~·;.t'·' · .. :. :.".f H1J~~t~~h\ 
LUNSFORD T •. NUCKOLS, -lR. eta(:. ;, : ·. ·i>:~:>.t·::~~-/~:·,; .d· :: 
Plafntfffl, ... :7~'', " .)i:~~ .. :; 
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v. 
I LLIAM FOSTER • Successor ·to:-;_.:; MOnON TO SE~~TE. PAR!IES 
RANDOLPH REED. Actfng Bufld-.:·,•·.: :· • . • . ·.~.;, .. «~~~"~'~ 
fng Offfcfal :. . ' ,. :. · '·r.HANCERY.f 2276·:·:.",···- ·~ 
~fddlesex·eounty· ... ·::··.: .. :··:·t"i'·.:·~ 
Saluda, Vtrgtnta 
and 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
HJDDLESEX r.GUHTY, to-wtt: 
A. CARL HANDLEY, ~R. 
DAVIDSON d. GILL 
FRED S. CRITTENDEN 
CHARLES R. REVERE 
FRANK JESSIE 
Pefen~ants 
. . ... ~ .· . •. 
:r' .• 




Come now, Defendants, WILLIAM FOSTER, Successor to RANDOLPH REED, Actfng 
Butldtng Offtcfal of Htddlesex·eoun~, Vtrgtnta, and·TH£ BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.~ 
0 • .·• 
OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY, to•wft: A. CARL HANDLEY, -lR., _l'AVIl'SCit d. SILL, FRED S. 
CRITTENDEN, CH~LES R. REVERE and FRANK JESSIE, b,y counsel, ·.and dear to ·the. 
petttfon ffled herefn and Sl,)' that ft fS not SUfffc~ent fn1law·.and OUght not 
to be prosecuted on the following gro,unds: ·. 
(1) The petttfon appears to seek recovery agatl)st both Defendants by ·.··:. 
. . . ' . . ·. ·::, ,:. 
requesting a Declaratory Jud(JD8nt and ~.anduws. a,th of ~!ch art ~qu1tablt·;~· 
remedies and further the petition seeks da.ages founded upon lft·llleged taktng 
. . .. , .. 
of Plaintiff's proper~. 1 purely L,gal rt~Ded,y, a.n of whtch constttutes a < :: . 
. '· .. 
misjoinder of causes of actton whtch bar-Platnttffs fro. recovery fn ~ts 
(2) There ts a mtsjotnder of Oefendants based on the f0110N1ng: 
.'1 
. ··=· L.". ,: 
. . :;~ 
' ·~· 






. ~ . . . 
. . I ,,t 
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: ~; ... 
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. ·-·~~{.· ·.: ; 
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(3) There ts .a mtsJo,tn~e!' of Pl~t~ttffs•, butd 9n -~.'ronowtng: .... · ·; 
A. Each application and the ac~ions taken thereon would of ~sf-
. . . ~· -· . . 
ty be based on different facts and cire~atances: and, :: ·;:.·:,: · · ... ;. 
. ·. l . . • ·~ .. • .••• ~~ 
B. The pleadings fan to:show that the Platnttffl Fletchers lllve •·· · · 
. . •.... ..;.;~·.;:.= ~ r:· 
exhausted their acbfnistrattve .1"8118~~es; and. . . ' . -~·t n.~f;~:·~ ::f:i 
c. The laws of Ytrgtnta, nettber ate provtstons'.for nor sanction· .. . i 
• 0 • • • •• !... ~ :J -~· 
.:· 
class action sutts; and, 
Thus the Plaf~ttffs named.fn the petitioners ~uft are.separate ~r 
legal entities ~mong whom the relationship riecessar,y to pen.ft 3ofnder fi 
lacking. 
(4) The pleadings are .vague, ~rg.antattve, •lsludt.ng and contatn 
counsel's conclusions and tlllphaSfs and IN IS SUCh t..,roper. . 
(5) Even assuming, ~rguendo the facts·alle;td.~n thl=pludt~gs to be 
true, the action of the De(endant, the Board of Supe"fl~rs ~ not con-
stitute a taking whtch ts compensable ~s the.p~lgatton·of the ordinance 
tn question ts a valtd exerctse !Jf polfc.: powers. 
(6) Yirgfnfp·~aw poses no burd~n on the Defendant,·tbi.Board of Super-
visors tu give notice of a ••tl.ng to take -subsequent .actton ·o~ a ·atter 
formerly discussed at a duly_adverttsed public .. att~g, espectall¥ as the .eat-
ing at which said actton was taken was~ ~gula!ll ~lltd IDnthlt ..attng.·· .· 
MOTION TO SEPARATE'PARTIES' 
Come now, Defendants, WILLIAM FOSTER. Succe~sor to 'RNCDOLPH REED, Actt.ng 
Bu11dt.ng Official of Middlesex County, Yt.rginta, and the BOARD Of SUPER~ISORS 
of MIDDLESEX COUNTY • to-wft: A. ~L HANDLEY • .m:, MYIDSON ~.'GILL, FRED s.· 
CRITTENDEN, CHARLES R. REVERE and FRANK .JESSIE, by_ counsel,, and IDYlS thts court 
. ... . 
to Order that the claims of each Plaint~ff herein be separately trted for th~ . 
. . 
following reasons: 
(1) Each applfcatfon and the actfons taken thereon would of nec11st~: . 
be based on different facts and·ctrcumstances: and, . 
f ~ • o·• ', o 0 t I 
· (Z} The pleadf.ngs~fat,l.'to·sbow t~at the Plafn~ttt•s,f1etcbers .ba~e;~-
. . .... ,. . . .· .. ; 
hausted thefr adiD~nfs~ratfve reae~tes; ~~.d, . :_., . . --:'_;· ;.· .. ·: 
(3f The laws of Ytrftnia, netther uke ptovtstons ·for'nor sanctton'" .-~~' · :. • 
class action sutts. ' • . . .. 
1
... . . . ·~::·~:.~~-~-. ; ·• 
'· t :·.·· 
.. •.· 












James H. Wardt Jr. 
Coamonweal th • s Attome,y 
tddlesex County, Ytrgtnta 
.o. Box 356 




WILLIAM FOSTER, Successor to 
RANDOLPH REED, Acting Butldtng Offfctal 
Middlesex Count~. · 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ·oF MIDDLESEX COUN 
to-wttz A. CARL HANDLEY, .JR., DAVIDSON · 
.J. GILL, FRED S. CRinEKDEH, CHARLES S. 
REVERE, FRANK .JESSIE 
·.·· 
It ts certtfted that the ortgtnal ·of the above DEMURRER and MOTION TO 
EPARATE PARTIES was 1111tled to Wtllt1111 B. CU.tng~, Esq., 112 South Pttt Street, 
.o. Box 1177, Afexandrta, Ytrgtnta, 22313 and to Conard B. Mattox, .Jr., Esq., 
09 Marston Lane, Richmond, Ytrgtnta 23221, Counsel tor Platnttffs on thts 
~ ll-~___..day of December, 1983. 
ames H. Ward, Jr. 
ommonwealth's Attorney 
tddlesex County 
.o. Box 356 




















IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
LUNSFORD T. NUCKOLS, JR. !! !!, 
Complainants 
v. IN CHANCERY #2276 
WILLIAM FOSTER, Successor to 
RANDOLPH REED, Acting Building 
0 f f i c i a I , M i dd I e sex County ,_. 
Saluda, Virginia, et !!• 
Defendants 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Come now, defendants, William Foster, Successor to Randolph 
Reed, Acting Building Official of Middlesex County, Saluda, Virginia, 
and the Board of Supervisors of Middlesex County, by counsel~ and 
move this Court to dismiss the above styled action. As grounds for 
such motion, the defendants state as follows: 
1. The compiainants admit in paragraph 15(a) of Count I, of 
. 
their petition that they have made demands upon the defendant Board 
of Supervisors as required by Virginia Code Section 15.1-554. 
2. The defendant Board of Supervisors disallowed all claims of 
complainants on July 5, 1983. 
3. The complainants have failed to perfect an appeal to such 
action of the defendant Board of Supervisors dlsal lowing such claims 
within the proper time period and in the proper maQner as set forth 
in Virginia Code Section 15.1-522. 
4. Virginia Code Section 15.1-553 provides that a 
determination by Board of Supervisors of any county disallowing a 




action in any court founded on such claim," unless an appeal is taken 
pursuant to Virginia Code Section 15.1-552 or unless the Board of 
Supervisors consent to the institution of an action by the claimant 
against the County, which consent has never been given. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants pray that this action be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
WILLIAM FOSTER, Successor to 
RANDOLPH REED, Acting Building 
Official, Middlesex County~ 
Saluda, Virginia et!! 
i:T_f/~·-
- ~- I (Jhfi------e H. wa#-Jr., 
Co onwealth's Atto ey 
adlesex County, Virginia 
.·P. 0. Box 356 
Saluda, Virginia 23149 
CERTif!_~!§_OF SER¥J~E 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the ~regoing was hand 
deliver~d t~ alI counsel of record on this~ day of 






























V I R G I N ·I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ~'iiDDLESEX COUNTY 












. WILLIAM FOSTER, Sticcesuor to RANDOLPH : 
REED, Acting Building Official of· • 
11iddlesex County, Saluda, Virginia, ·: IN CHANCERY 
: NO. 2276 
-and- . 
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. 
l1iddlesex County Courthouse 
Saluda, Virginia 
Monday, March 26, 1984 
The.above~entitled cau~e c~me on to be heard, 
before the HONORABLE JOHN E. DeHARDIT, Judge in and for the 
Circuit Court of Middlesex County, in the Courthouse, 
Saluda, Virginia, beginning at two.o'clock p.m. 
APPEARANCES: 
On behalf of the Complainants: 
WILLI~1 B. CUMMINGS, ESQUIRE 
On behalf of the Defendants: 
JAMES H. liARD I JR. ' ESQUIRE 
Commonwealth Attorney 
Also Present: James c. Breeden, Esquire 
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* * * 17 
a motion to dismiss, I certainly think that all counsel shculd 
be here. I don't kno\'1 t..'hy he is not here. 
Was he advised of this hearing? 
MR. WARD: He was here the last time, Your Honor. 
MR. CUMMINGS: He w~s here last time, Your Honor, 
and I was advised -- it's been a month or so since I last 
spoke with him, but he was advised of this hearing. He 
was copied by me of the date and so forth, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you know why he is not present? 
l'iR. CUMMINGS: Because as I mentioned before, Your 
Honor, m~ client was consulting with both of us and engaging 
two counsel, if you will, in his case. He instructed us 
that in matters where it was not absolutely necessary to 
have both counsel present in the judgment of the counsel,_ 
that. we not double up on the appearance. And Mr. Maddox 
and I understood this was my motion; that it was mine to 
respond to. And I have done the research and was prepared 
to argue it today~ So he was-- to have been·here would 
have been just a cost expense to my client and not something 
which the counsel thought was appropriate. 
THE COURT:· Gentlemen, I do feel like 15.1-553 
has some merit in it. I will be truthful; I do think it 
has some merit in it. But I am not sure if the Court has 
RUDIGER & GREEN REPORTING SERVICE 
CERTIFIED' 
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1 question about that. 
2 They own the -- the piece of property which they 
3 own, Your Honor, is more than valuable enough to assess 
4 that. 
5 The second question ~our Honor raised, though, 
6 and I will just address it briefly because it is of concer~ 
7 to the C~urt, there are studies that have been made, Your 
8 Honor, of that area, in terms of the prevailing winds and 
9 that sort of thing. And it is a prime area, _the place 
10 where the windmills have been sited is a prime area becausE 
11 of the body of water that is adjacent to the property, for 
I 12 the wind effect. This is the the principal wind in thi~ 
13 area comes right across --
14 THE COURT: Most of the windmills that have been 
15 constructed'in the last four or five years in this area, 
16 though there are few that have been, have not been real 
17 satisfactory. 
18 Is this a different type of windmill that they 
19 plan to use? 
20 MR. CUMMINGS: Well, I have seen the design for 
21 it, Your Honor, and seen the literature in support of it. 
22 THE COURT: Do we have an expert that would come 
23 in 
I a 
RUDIGER & GREEN REPORTING SERVICE 
.. CERTIFIED vr ?ATE AS 
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1 l1R. CUMMINGS: Yes, ·sir. 
2 THE COURT: I mean this is not frivolous; that':~ 
3 what I want to get at. You know, there is so much talk 
4 about frivolous lawsuits and now if this is a frivolous 
5 suit, I don't want to have it take place in Middlesex. I 
6 want to know definitely whether this is a valid claim---
7 MR. CUt~INGS: To the contrary. 
8 THE COURT: to use, that these windmills can 
9 provide take care of enough energy for a home, a 
10 furnace, a stove, a refrigerator, a washer; a drier and 
11 those type of things • 
. 
I 12 MR. CUMMINGS: The estimates that have been givei, 
13 Your Honor, and I have seen the estimates, Your Honor, is 
14 that the windmill, in its proposed location and the type oj 
15 windmill that's proposed -- I can't, unfortunately -- I 
16 don't have the technical literature in front of me, but I 
17 can tell you I have seen it -- indicate that this windmill 
18 would not only suffice to produce energy more than sufficiEnt 
19 to cover the home needs of this house, but also provide a 
20 surplus. As the Court well knows, VEPCO is required by 
21 statute to accept back and pay for surplus electricity 
22 generated by horne generators. 
23 THE COURT: Assuming tha~ you are correct, can't 
• .! 
RUDIGER & GREEN REPORTING SERVICE 
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1 these windmills be put on -- somewhere on this property othel 
2 than where you have suggested putting them? 
3 MR. CU~~INGS: Again, Your Honor, I --my clients 
4 have had engineering studies and wind studies done and they 
5 are advised that this is the prime location. That's been 
6 my understanding and I have seen the reports to that 
7 effect. 
8 THE COURT: Well, couldn't you move them several 
9 hundred feet to a different place on the same property and 
10 still have the same effect? 
11 MR. CU~4INGS: Because of the wind tunnel effect, 
I' 
12 Your Honor, and the trees -- this is a very wooded area --
13 on either side of the house, with obstructions every bit as 
14 high or higher than this proposed windmill structure, I 
15 might add --· it is my understanding, Your Honor, within a 
16 few feet of the proposed location, there is not ~uch 
17 latitude. There is a few feet latitude, obviously, but 
18 beyond that, Your Honor, in terms of getting out of that arec , 
19 I'm told 
20 THE COURT: What is the cost of·these windmills? 
21 MR. CUMMINGS: 1 think between $10 and $15,000, 
22 Your Honor, most of which will be deducted as an energy 
23 credit. I think 1984· or 1985 are probably the last two yeais 
.. RUDIGER 8c GREEN REPORTING SERVICE 
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* * 30 
Honor and his burden, I think, to present that, since it is 
his motion. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I need. 
MR. WARD: Well, Your Honor, the bill of complaint 
is contrary to what Mr. Cummings is telling us. He has 
stated in his bill of complaint that they made other demanos 
for compensation. 
MR. CU~MINGS: What we told them at the time, You~ 
Honor, as Mr. Ward well knows because he was there, was tha~ 
if they pass an ordinance that takes our property, that, 
say, does not allow us the right to build on our property, 
if they pass such an ordinance, then they would be taking 
our property. 
But it was a conditional suggestion, Your Honor, 
conditional terms we're making a claim, don't pass this 
ordinance. It is not a valid ordinance. We gave them a 
memorandum to that effect. 
Without further notice to us, Your Honor, they 
ruled a week -- three days later, afte~ the Fourth of July 
holiday, they reconvened and passed the ordinance. 
So that a couple of days later, the State Technic~! 
Review Board said that you should have given the building 
permit originally. And only then, Your Honor, did we file 
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: ., VIRGINIA: 
I N THE c I RCU IT COURT OF M I.DDLESEX COUNTYU ~::~·:~- .. 
LUNSFORD T. NUCKOLS, JR.,~!!!·, 
Complainants 
v. 
WILLIAM FOSTER, Successor to 
RANDOLPH REED, Acting Building 
Official, Middlesex County 
Saluda, Virginia,~!!!·' 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
IN CHANCERY #2276 
Come now, defendants, Wi II iam Foster, Successor to Randolph 
Reed, Acting Building Official of Middlesex County, Saluda, Virginia, 
and the Board of Supervisors of Middlesex County, by counsel, and 
move this Court to dismiss the above styled action. As grounds for 
such motion, the defendants state as follows: 
1. The complainants admit in paragraph 15(a) of Count l, of 
their petition that they have made demand~ upon the defendant Board 
of Supervisors as required by Virginia Code Section 15.1-554. 
2. The defendant Board of Supervisors disallowed all claims of 
complai.nants on July 5, 1983. 
3. The complainants• amended petition for writ of mandemus 
reflects under paragraph 15(a) that the aforesaid demands were made 
and furthermore, ref I ects and admits in paragraph~ 22, 28, and 33 
among others, that the Board had not a II owed or conceded to. their 
demands. Furthermore, at a sp-ecial meeting of the Middlesex County 
Board of Supervisors held on February 16, 1983 the Board in 
considering the options stated that it "would be the best course of 
38 
. " 
a c t i on " t o w a i t f o r a dec i s i on from the Fed e r a I Av i a t i on 
Administration and then seek an injunction to prohibit cons.truction 
of the windmill, if a building permit is issued. The Board at that 
time specifically considered the application of Mr. L. T. Nuckols and 
its options including among other things condemnation. Nevertheless 
it set forth its cause of action as stated above •. See certified copy 
of an abstract of such minutes attached hereto. 
At the July 5, 1983 hearing of the Board of Supervisors of 
Middlesex County (a certified copy of the appropriate abstract of 
minutes being attached hereto as an exhibit) the letter of John 
McCarthy, Assist_ant Attorney General for the State of Virginia was 
read in its entirety. That letter reflects that the ordinance would 
be under the pol ice power rather than under the eminent domain power 
and f u r t he r r e f !' e c t s t h a t ••. t he I and own e r 1 s con cess i on t h rough 
counsel in this instance would indicate that the economically viable 
uses of the land are not generally invol-v:~d." At that meeting as the 
a b s t r a c t o f m i n u t e s i nd i c a t e s , upon mo t i on d u I y rna de and seconded , 
the ordinance was unanimously adopted. 
Notwithstanding the above, the Board of Supervisors, at a 
me e t i ng on Sept emb e r 1 2 , 1 9 8 3 , a c e r t i f i e d copy o f the a b s t r a c t o f 
such minutes being attached hereto as an exhibit, the Board 
unanimously voted to keep the airport at its present location. 
Reference is made to an affidavit attached hereto from a 
member of the Board of Supervisors of Mi dd I esex County, Virginia 
confirming that all demands made by the 'claimants were denied and 




4 • The complainants have failed to perfect an appeal to such 
action of the defendant Board of Supervisors disallowing such claims 
within the proper time period and the proper manoer as set forth in 
Virginia Code S~ction 15.1-552. 
5 . Virginia Code Section 15.1-553 provides that a 
determination by Board of Supervisors of any county disallowing a 
claim 11 shall be final and conclusive and a perpetual bar to any 
action in any court founded on such clai~," unless an appeal is taken 
pursuant to Virginia Code Section 15.1-552 or unless the Board of 
Supervisors consent to the institution of an action by the claimant 
against the County, which consent has never been given. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants pray that this action be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
H. Ward, Jr., 
wealth's Att ney 
Virginia 
23149 
WILLIAM FOSTER, Successor to 
RANDOLPH REED, Acting Building 
Official, Middlesex County, 
Sal da, Virginia e al 
By; 
--~~~~~~--~~-----
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing motion to 
dismiss, accompanying exhibits and Brief in Support of the Motion 
to Dismiss was mailed postage prepaid to all counsel or record on 




STATE OF VIRGINIA, 
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, to-wit: 
The undersigned member of the Board of Supervisors for Middlesex 
County, Virginia being duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. That he was a member of the Board of Supervisors of 
Middlesex County, Virginia on the dates in 1983 when alI actions were 
taken by the Board concerning the demands and claims of Lunsford T. 
Nuckols, Jr. and Elizabeth S. Nuckols, Marshal I D. Beard and Bernard 
L. Fletcher and Pansy M. Fletcher relating to: not passing the 
ordinance entitled 11 An Ordinance to Regulate the Construction, 
Erection or Installation of Hazardous Structures in the Vicinity of 
Hunmel Field, pursuant to Section 15.1-504, 15.1-505, and 15.1-510, 
of the Code of Virginia of 1959, as amended;" the issuance to them 
of permits to construct windmi I Is on their property adjacent to the 
airport; and the treatment of the property as condemned if the 
permits were not issued and ordinance passed. 
2. AI I demands and claims by the complainants as reflected above 
have been denied by the Board of Supervisors. 
_/1:_~~ 
Subscribed and sworn to before ~-i-~~ Coun~foresaid, in the 
State of Virginia this ~~ay of~---------' 1984. 
My COITTTlission expires: ~~::?4 /9£3{&_ 
( DA I L Y 2 I A • ) 
----~1J,~~ Yh~~~---
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
















In Chancery No. 2276 
WILLIAM FOSTER, SUCCESSOR TO 
RANDOLPH REED, 
ACTING BUILDING OFFICIAL 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY 




This cause came on to be heard on the pleadings filed herein 
and upon the joint motion of the parties to substitute T. Booker 
Moore in place of William Foster as a defendant, and it 
APPEARING to the Court that William Foster was named as a 
defendant in his official capacity as Acting Building Official 
of Middlesex County and has since been replaced by T. Booker 
Moore as the Building Official and.that the motion to substitute 
should be granted. 
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is 
ADJUDGED and ORDERED that. T. Booker Moore, Building Official 
of Middlesex County, shall be substituted as party defendant for 
William Foster, Acting Building Inspector of Middlesex County, 
and the Clerk shall make the appropriate notation on the file. 










WILLIAM B. CUMMINGS 
WILLIAM B. CUMMING , P.C. 
112 South Pitt Street 
Post Office Box 1177 
Alexandria, Virginia 22313 
(703) 836-7997 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
CONARD B. MATTOX, JR., ESQUIRE 
309 Marston Lane 
Richmond, Virginia 23221 
(804) 353-5176 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
SEEN AND AGREED: 
JAMES H • WARD I JR. I ESQUIRE 
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY 
Middlesex County 
Post Office Box 356 
Saluda, Virginia 23149 






II V I R G I N I A: 
II IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 





.1 WILLIAM FOSTER, SUCCESSOR TO 
RANDOLPH REED, 
ACTING BUILDING OFFICIAL 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY 



















In Chancery No. 2276 
THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the pleadings filed herein il 
II 'j and upon the motion of petitioners, MARSHALL D. BEARD and NANCY M. 
1 BEARD, by counsel, to non-suit this proceeding as to them only, 
11 and it 
APPEARING to the Court that the petitioners have a statutory II !i right to non-suit as to themselves,· ·and that the motion should be 
II 
I! granted, 
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is j! 
,, 
1
',! and N::::D:~DB:::D0::E:::_:::: :::sm:::::n°:s~::::::,D~n:E::: 
case shall stand dismissed without prejudice as to them only, 
I and the Clerk shall remove the names of MARSHALL D. BEARD and 





















I WE ASK FOR THIS : 
,, 
j! 
p ~~~~--~~~--~--~~~~-i CONRAD B. MATTOX, JR. ESQUIRE 
i 309 Marston Lane 
I Richmond, Virginia 23221 II {804) 353-5176 



























JAMES H. WARD, JR., ESQUIRE 
Commonwealth's Attorney 
Middlesex County 
Post Office Box 356 
Saluda, Virginia 23149 
Order 
Lunsford T. Nuckols, Jr.,~ al. 
v. 
William Foster, Successor to 
Randolph Reed, 
Acting Building Official 
Middlesex County 
Saluda, Virginia, et al. 
In Chancery No. 2276 --
II 









V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
LUNSFORD T. NUCKOLS, JR., et al., 
Complainants, 
v. 
WILLI~1 FOSTER, SUCCESSOR TO 
RANDOLPH REED, 
ACTING BUILDING OFFICIAL 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY . 
















In Chancery No. 2276 
THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the pleadings filed herein 
and upon the motion of petitioner~ BERNARD L. FLETCHER and 
PM~SY L. FLETCHER, by counsel, to non-suit this proceeding 
as to them only, and it 
APPEARING to the Court that the petitioners have a 
: 
statutory right to non-suit as to themselves, and that the 
motion should b~ granted, 
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is 
ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the motion of BERNARD L. FLETCHER 
and PANSY L. FLETCHER to non-suit tqis action is granted, and 
the case shall stand dismissed without prejudice as to them 
only, and the Clerk shall ·remove the names qf BERNARD L. FLETCHER 
and PANSY L. FLETCHER as parties to the action. 






I WE ASK FOR THIS: 
./- --,/ /. -
. 4/cc t: c:.· .) (L,~'-c:. <-~ 
;=WILLIAM . CUMMINGS, 
;, WILLIAM B. CUMMINGS, 
:· 112 South Pitt Street 
Post Office Box 1177 
Alexandria, Virginia 22313 
(703) 836-7997 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
j: 
!; ~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~ 
1.··.1 CONARD B. MATTOX, JR., ESQUIRE 
309 t·1arston Lane 
.. 
!' Richmond, Virginia 23221 
ii (804) 353-5176 





;: JAMES H. WARD, JR. I ESQUIRE 
!: Conunonweal th' s Attorney 
1: Middlesex County 
r! Post Office Box 356 





























William Foster, Successor to 
Randolph Reed, 
Acting Building Official 
Middlesex County 
Saluda, Virginia, et al. 





V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
LUNSFORD T. NUCKOLS, JR., et al., 
Complainants, 
L ---.. ',. ti .• · 
I'··' • .. ··. 














In Chancery No. 2276 
:: 
;. WILLIAM FOSTER, SUCCESSOR TO 
:: RANDOLPH REED , 
ACTING BUILDING OFFICIAL 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
SALUDA, VIRGINIA, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
This cause carne on to be heard on the pleadings filed herein 
and upon the motion of the Petitioners, by counsel, to non-suit 
Count III of the amended petition, and it 
APPEARING to the court that the petitioners have an absolute 
' right to non-suit Count III and that the motion should be granted. 
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that 
the rnotion to non-suit Count III of the amended petition be and 
the same hereby is granted and count III is dismissed, without 
prejudice. 














WE ASK FOR THIS: 
ILLIAM B. CUMMINGS, 
WILLIAM B. CUMMINGS, 
112 South Pitt Street 
Post Office Box 1177 
Alexandria, Virginia 22313 
(703) 836-7997 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
~RD B. MATTOX, JR., ESQUIRE 
309 Marston Lane 
Richmond, Virginia 23221 
(804) 353-5176 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
SEEN: 
J~S H. WARD, JR., ESQUIRE 
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY 
Middlesex County 
Post Office Box 356 
Saluda, Virginia 23149 





























V I R G I N I A : 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
-x 




WILLIAM FOSTER, Successor 
to RANDOLPH REED, Acting 
Building Official of 
Middlesex County, Saluda, 
Virginia 
and 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 
Defendants. 
: 
IN CHANCERY NO. 2276 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 
Middlesex County Courthouse 
Saluda, Virginia 
Wednesday, June 6, 1984 
The above-entitled matter came on to be heard 
before THE HONORABLE JOHN E. DeHARDIT, J~dge, in and for 
the Circuit Court of Middlesex County, Virginia, beginning 
at 11:04 o'clock a.m. 
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On Behalf of the Complainants: 
WILLIAM B. CUMMINGS, ESQUIRE 
CONRAD B. MATTOX, JR., ESQUIRE 
On Behalf of the Defendants: 
JAMES H. WARD, JR., ESQUIRE 
Commonwealth's Attorney 
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P R 0 C E E D I N G S 
(Whereupon the Court Reporter was duly sworn 
by the Clerk. ) 
THE COURT: Gentlemen, do you wish to be 
limited as to time of argument? 
MR. WARD: I don't think·:so:..: · ... I think I ~can limit: 
my argument. 
MR. CUMMINGS: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: Don't wish to be limited either 
side. Are there any witnesses to be sworn? 
MR. WARD: No, sir. 
MR. CUMMINGS: Not for today. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. WARD: Judge, before we start, I believe 
we have some matter-s we need to take care of. The 
plaintiff's attorneys have forwarded petitions for nonsuitin9 
Fletcher's Defendants Fletcher and Beard. 
MR. CUMMINGS: Plaintiffs. 
MR. WARD: Excuse me, plaint~ffs Fletcher 
and Beard and also an order looks like to substitute Mr. 
Booker Moore who is a new acting Building Official in 
place of William Foster who was the Building Official; and 
also they have a motion to nonsuit Count III of the 
RUDIGER 8c GREEN REPORTING SERVICE 
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4 
particular amended Bill of Complaint that they first 
filed. 
We have no objection because those are 
following right in line with some of our points on the 
merits. We would ask that the defendants Beard excuse 
me, plaintiffs Beard and Fletcher be dismissed with 
prejudice as opposed to without prejudice. 
THE COURT: The argument on that, gentlemen? 
MR. CUMMINGS: Your Honor please, the statute 
clearly provides for allowance of a nonsuit without 
prejudice if it comes at such time prior to the defendants 
filing an answer. 
The defendants in this case have only filed 
a demurrer and a motion to dismiss neither of which is a 
plea to the merits of both. So, under the statute, Your 
Honor, I cite the statute 8.230 or something, the nonsuits 
are to be taken without prejudice by statute; and I would 
ask that they be allowed to be taken without prejudice. 
I don't know if they plan to refile or n~t. As I've heard 
judges say, "We'll take up the prejudice at such time as 
they file the suit in the future" as opposed to doing it 
now. I think that's appropriate time to see what argument 
might be raised at that time. 
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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Mr. Ward? 
MR. WARD: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: The Court will grant on a limited 
basis. Thank you, Mr. Ward. 
MR. CUMMINGS: May I submit those orders, Your 
Honor. 
MR. WARD: Let me sign them. 
(The bailiff handed some documents to the 
Court for its examination.) 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ward. 
MR. WARD: Yes, Your Honor. May it· please 
the Court, we're here on this today on the motion to 
dismiss that the County has filed. We filed it according 
.. 
to the noncompliance with certain code sections be it 
15.2-552, 553 and 554 Code of Virginia. 
As the Court will note, when suing the County, 
-1 
I 
there are specific guidelines which you musH follow that's 
not always required in other circumstances. Now, 15.1-554 
states that "no action shall be maintain~d by any person 
against a county upon a claim or demand unless such person 
shall have first presented the claim to the Board of 
Supervisors." Any claim or demand. 
The language is sufficiently understandable and 
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the cases are replete that is means any claim either 
equitable or legal in nature. This is a rule. This is 
a norm. There are exceptions. The erroneous tax suits 
there's specific statutes for that which give you guidelines 
on how to file those suits: There are certain equitable 
situations where there have been diversion of funds by 
the Board of Supervisors. 
Now, these are all cases which have been cited 
by both parties here today; but we still take the position 
that this is the norm; any claim or demand. 
The actions which we have are mandamus and 
declaratory judgment, and there's no provisions in the 
statutes that states-- that really preclude·or exclude 
the necessity for compliance·with these statutes. 
Now, mandamus and declaratory judgments are 
not just used against the County, they're used against 
individuals, agents of administrative agencies or what not; 
though there is no language that states if you're going to 
use these particular code provisions you.do not have to 
comply with the elements. You must make the demands. 
Evidently plaintiff's attorneys feel that as 
a necessity for making demands because in their amended 
bill lSA states, Nuckols, Beard and Fletcher have made 
RUDIGER 8c GREEN REPORTING SERVICE 
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1 demands upon the Board of Supervisors, Middlesex County to 
2 not enact the questioned ordinance because it was invalid, a1d 
3 otherwise made demand to obtain their permits to construct 
4 buildings on their land as well as other demands for 
5 compensation as ~~quired by 15.1~554. 
6 So, evidently, they feel that these Code sections 
7 apply. 
8 Now, let's go on to 15.1-553. That states, 
9 when this latter was claimed, when it's filed, what one 
10 must do if it has been denied. 
11 Now, we believe that there is sufficient 
12 evidence in·the pleadings that state that these have been 
13 denied. Back in February 16 of 1983, we have·minutes from 
14 that meeting which state when they first were brought up 
15 about these building permits that the Board of Supervisors 
16 went on record to oppose it; to do what was necessary to 
17 prevent these windmills from being built. 
18 On July 5, 1983, the Board of Supervisors 
19 enacted an ordinance which precluded the.bui1ding of these 
20 type of structures. If there was any question as to the 
21 intent or of the Board of Supervisors, again on 
22 September 12, 1983 just prior to the election, there was 
I e 23 a special meeting called to discuss the issue of the 
I :l 
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1 airport. This was something that the Board of Supervisors 
2 wanted to make known to the electorate because it was 
3 a peripheral issue in the election, and they again went on 
4 record to leave the airport where it was. 
5 Mr. Handleyt, the Chairman of the Board of 
6 Supervisors has signed an affidavit, an affidavit was 
7 attached to our motion to.· dismiss stating that all of the 
8 claims and demands of the petitioners have been denied; 
9 and we feel that there are certain provisions in the 
10 amended Bill of Complaint by which the plaintiffs feel 
11 that they've also been denied. 
12 Under Section 28, it states, "The defendants 
13 in denying the complainants' ap~lications are improperly 
14 denied on invalid points." We feel that there's no 
15 question that the claims h~ve been denied. We feel, thus, 
16 we have to go to the most peripheral section which is 
17 15.1-552, and that states, the time frame which one must 
18 come in to appeal a decision ar demand,a claim made to 
19 the Board of Supervisors. 
20 It appears that the plaintiffs have apparently 
21 overlooked this provision. There's nothing alleged in 
22 the pleadings that they've complied with it. In fact, 
. ~ 23 the record shows that they have not. They are to serve 
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9 
notice on the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors, post a 
bond with surity none of which has been done. 
When the Board of Supervisors on July 5th, 1983 
passed this ordinance, that's when the claims were denied. 
That's when the ~~atute of limitations began to run. The 
six-month period would have run in January of 1984. The 
bond has not been posted. Nothing has been done to date. 
In the County, the case that we cited, Parker 
versus Prince William County, many things were decided in 
that case; but one of which was the necessity of following 
this procedure. They stated in that instance that following 
that procedure was jurisdictional and it was pertinant 
and had to be done. It was progedural. 
That was a situation where the County, I believe 
for the land fill and sewage system close to a man's hotel, 
and they sought compensation ,under: a .. · condemnation 
proceedings; but the main thrust of that particular case 
was even though the parties made note and notified the 
Clerk of the Board of the Supervisors of his intention to 
file suit, and although they filed and posted a $50 check, 
the Court ruled that this was not sufficient compliance 
with the Code section. It states that it must be a bond 
with surity. This was not done in that particular case, 
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1 and it was some nine and a half months after the claim 
2 was made and for that reason the action was dismissed. 
3 We feel that the actions that have been 
4 brought by the petitioners fall within the perview of the 
5 statutes, and th~t the failure to comply with them as is 
6 set forth on the record is critical and for those reasons 
7 the action should be dismissed with prejudice. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. ward. Mr. Cummings 
9 or Mr. Mattox. 
10 MR. CUMMINGS: Your Honor please, Mr. Mattox 
11 and I are co-counsel for the complainants and will probably 
12 try and jointly address the Court on this issue if that's 
13 satisfactory with the Court. 
14 With regard to the matter Mr. Ward has addressed, 
15 the Court, Your Honor, I trust the Court has received our 
16 memorandum we filed about a month ago? 
17 THE COURT: I've received it. I have it before· 
18 me, and I've read it; and I would deposit it with the 
19 Clerk when the hearing is vver. 
.· 
20 MR. CUMMINGS: Thank you, Your Honor. With 
21 the permission of the Court, I will address issues already 
22 raised and if Your Honor wants to pass along, just say so 
• ! 23 and I'll move it on to other issues; but I will be following 
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my brief and my argument if that's satisfactory. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. You and Mr. Mattox both 
want to argue, is that right? 
MR. CUMMINGS: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then both of you will argue. Then 
Mr. Ward will close. 
MR. CUMMINGS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. CUMMINGS: The motion to dismiss, Your Honor 
which was filed here when we were before the Court back in 
March supplemented by Mr. Ward's additional filing of a 
new motion and brief in support thereof, essentially says 
that the case should be dismissed because we failed to 
comply with 15.1-552 failing to notify the Court -- the 
County Board. 
With regard to Count III of our Complaint, 
Your Honor, the one seeking inverse condemnation or damages 
for the taking, we have now non sui ted that action. To the 
extent that 15.1-552 applies in this case, it would apply 
only to Count III. 
Now, we maintained throughout that Count III 
was an alternative relief and should not have been viewed 
as a primary focus of our complaint but rather than get off 
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on that tangent, we've no.w norisuited Count III. 
The primary relief sought by the plaintiffs 
in this case and still sought now as the only relief sought 
is for mandamus. Mandamus against a Building Official to 
issue building pe~its. This is not an evidentiary case. 
This is not a case involving testimony or witnesses. It's 
a question of the law. Was he required to issue the permit 
or not. 
The amended complaint made reference -- made 
mention of the fact that a claim had been presented to the 
County. In fact, the County was told of our position, our 
legal position, on the ordinance that was being proposed 
and the consequences that would.run there if the ordinance 
was passed and the building permit was denied. That 
is it was our contention that that would have the effect 
of a taking, and that we suggest that they were stepping 
into an area where they might have some economic 
consequences to the County for having damaged the property. 
So, to that extent, the County was notified 
and put on notice of what our contention was of a potential 
claim. And, so, Count III in our complaint said for 
alternative relief we're asking the Court that if the 
building permit is not alluwed, that would have a diminution 
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13 
of the value of the property, restriction on the use of the 
property and therefore, damages would flow; but only if the 
Court ruled that mandamus would not issue. It was only 
alternative relief. 
As we state in our memorandu~,Your Honor, in 
opposition to the County's motion to dismiss, and Building 
Official's motion to dismiss, this statute clearly does not 
apply in a situation where the relief sought is mandamus 
because you can't go 
THE COURT: What's the difference at that 
point? What's the difference? Why do you distinguish 
between the mandamus? I read this, but can you elaborate 
more on that. 
MR. CUMMINGS: Pretty much the language, Your 
Honor please; I'll go to one of the cases that we cited 
that was the case of Dominion Chevrolet --
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CUMMINGS: versus County of Henrico, 
1976 case. There there was a situation ~?volving tax 
issue, Your Honor, and the Court said the section 15.1-552 
does not specifically provide for the correction of an 
erroneous tax assessment. It relates only to a claim or 
demand talking about monetary demands. It goes on to say 
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the reason why this is done; why you don't follow that 
procedure because to follow that procedure, to follow that 
logic would be to dismiss the other statute; the tax 
assessment statute, and that statute would be without 
value because such claims could only reach the Court from 
an appeal from the Board of Supervisors which is not the 
intention of the legislature. 
THE COURT: Is this an indirect thing that you 
couldn't do directly? Is that what you're trying to say? 
MR. CUMMINGS: No, Your Honor. When you 
In this situation, Your Honor, where the Building Official 
has refused to issue a permit and cites a reason therefor 
which we claim to be an invalid,reason, then the purpose 
of the mandamus is to have an expeditious hearing to see 
if that permit should have or should not have been denied; 
and as the Supreme Court said in the Dominion Chevrolet 
case, the object of the statute is to furnish an 
expeditious and inexpensive remedy against taxes which 
have been assessed or collected, and the:object would 
be frustrated if you followed the logic of requiring the 
claim to go against the County and then be appealed through 
the Circuit Court by virtue of that route. 
The same with mandamus. This Court has 
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1 inherent powers as well as statutory power. to issue mandamus. 
2 Mandamus is most frequently issued against a public official 
3 in this case a County public official; and to have to go 
4 back to his supervisors, if you will, and file the appeal 
5 and go through a .six-month delay process, there, if you 
6 will, we'd never get mandamus in time. We'd be constantly 
7 going through the administrative remedy for mandamus. 
8 We followed the administrative procedures for 
9 the building permit. When the appeal -- When the permit 
10 was denied initially, we followed administrative procedures 
11 act, went to the building appeals board here locally, and 
12 when they denied our appeal, went to the State Technical 
13 Review Board in Richmond, follo~ed the statutory provision 
14 to the letter. They approved our case. They reversed the 
15 decision of the Building Official. 
16 Then, he still refused to issue it. So, we came 
17 to the Court for the mandamus to issue the permits. A quest~on 
18 of law: Was he right or was he wrong when he issued -- when 
19 he denied the issuance of the permit. Al.l the cases cited 
20 by the Board of Supervisors as I point out in our brief, 
21 every one of them, Your Honor, deals with a monetary 
22 claim against the County. That's the kind of claim they're 
. ' 23 
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In the Prince William case --
THE COURT: 'Is:· this indirectly a monetary 
claim now? 
MR. CUMMINGS: No, sir. Absolutely not. Mr. 
.and Mrs. Nuckols, Your Honor, have sought a permit to 
build a wind generating turbine. They have asked for that. 
They filed -- they complied with all the statutory 
requirements. They followed them to the letter. They 
followed the administrative review procedures when it was 
denied to the letter. We maintain . ·. they're entitled to 
it. 
There are two grounds upon which they're 
entitled to it we maintain. We maintain that taking 
as the Court'must do when reviewing a claim against the 
statute, first try and find a way that the relief can be 
granted to the complainant and still keep the statute 
intact. That's the Court's first test in reviewing the 
situation. We maintain in Count I that if the Court is 
.. 
to view this case --
THE COURT: Suppose you hadn't nonsuited 
Count III based on your argument now? 
MR. CUMMINGS: Based upon my argument now, Your 
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1 Honor, I think Count III standing in alternative relief, 
2 the Court could still maintain this case because Count III 
3 Your Honor, is --
4 THE COURT: You were asking for monetary 
5 damages there, w~re you not? Compensatory damage, property 
6 taken or right taken? 
7 MR. CUMMINGS: Yes, sir. Again, because it was 
8 not the primary relief sought, Your Honor, because we 
9 maintain this Court would still grant the relief we have 
10 requested, that relief being the issuance of the building 
• 
11 permit . 
12 Now, if this Court after hearing this case on 
13 its merits denies our request, we then would have the 
14 option, if we sought, to file a claim against the County; 
15 and we would have to go through those procedures at that 
16 time. 
17 Now, at the present time, Your Honor, this 
18 Court's only question before this Court is issuance of a 
19 mandamus; ··ability tO issue for ope of two req.sons: One, 
20 because the statute on its face is illegal,and therefore, 
21 we're grandfathered and we have the right because of~the 
22 grandfather language in the statute; or two, the Court 
23 
. ~ finds --
·~ 
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THE COURT: Why did you bring Count III? 
MR. CUMMINGS: It's in the form of alternative 
relief, Your Honor. It was a method --
THE COURT: It could have been something that 
if that's what y~u wanted the Court could have gone along. 
Was it possible the Court could have gone along with that? 
You stated that now you ·cane along some later time they go 
along with that claim. So, you were asking for monetary 
damages in this particular suit, were you not? 
MR. CUMMINGS: Only in the form of alternative 
relief, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I mean what's alternative? Not 
your asking for, old common lawtpleading last·minute number 
of things in the alternative; but you're still asking for 
what you're asking for. 
MR. CUMMINGS: That's correct, Your Honor. I 
think as to Count III perhaps technically perhaps we 
should have complied with the statute. The matter is now 
moot as I said because we nonsuited Coun~ III and should at 
such time we reach the merits on Counts I and II, Your 
Honor, we'll then deal with the issue of filing a claim 
against --
THE COURT: Then I go back are ·you trying to do 
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~ 
1 something indirectly that you couldn't do directly because 
2 you had Count III there? 
3 MR. CUMMINGS: As Mr. Ward said, Your Honor, 
4 perhaps it was an oversight on counsel's part of the 
5 necessity of filing that particular aspect. That's not 
6 what my clients want. Mr. Mattox and my client both want 
7 to have the permit issued, Your Honor, as requested. 
8 they've gone through a lot of trouble to get the permit 
9 issued, Your Honor. They went through the County Building 
10 Official. They've got all the plans. They have 
11 engineers study the plans. All the plans meet all the 
12 requirement specifications that are required under the 
13 Building Code, Your Honor; and having been denied that, 
14 they went through the administrative review of that and 
15 the State Technical Appeal Board says you're entitled to 
16 the permit. The reason given for its denial are erroneous. 
17 You're entitled to the permit. 
18 You then turn around and say we're not going 
19 to issue it for a second and different r~ason, and that 
20 reason being we now have a statute which says bars you. 
21 This Court has to then interpret that statute 
.22 to see whether or not they have grandfather rights under 
. ~ 23 that statute or, two, if t.~1e statute is improper and was 
. ~ RUDIGER 8: G.---·' ....... OORTING SERVICE 
CERTIF t REPORTERS 68 ) DRIVE 

























. " 23 
• -!· 
~ •• ~ I ' 
20 
illegally enacte~ in which case the State Technical 
Review Board's position would then become the law. These 
people would be entitled to their permit, and that's all 
we're seeking at this time, Your Honor. 
Mr. Mattox may wish to expand on that. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Mr. 
Mattox, Court will now give you time. 
MR. MATTOX: Your Honor, might be better if Mr. 
Ward would be permitted 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, I'll wait until both of 
them have finished. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. MATTOX: Your H9nor, there's riot but one 
question before the Court today as the statutes of the 
pleadings are at this moment, one question and that is 
whether Mr. Ward's argument goes to the power of this 
Court under these facts to issue a mandamus or declaratory 
judgment. That's all. 
THE COURT: But you're saying that later you're 
going to ask for monetary damages. 
MR. MATTOX: No, sir. I'm not saying that at 
all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I gathered that . 
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MR. MATTOX: No, sir. There is not one thing 
in the pleadings today that requires any prerequisite act 
on behalf of the plaintiffs in this case that they have 
not done. There is no requirement of notice to anyone 
about a declaratory judgment proceeding:s or an injunction 
as the case may be. 
So, all this other stuff whether the permit 
was issued right or wrong or indifferent, at this moment 
is not before the Court. What's before the Court today is 
whether Mr. Ward's argument goes to the Court's right to 
issue or consider an injunction. That's all. And, the 
other things that was talked about the last hearing and some 
of the things mentioned here_today that is not before this 
.· 
hearing right now. 
So, I just think all the Court's got to do is 
decide whether 15.1-550 whatever it is, two, whether or 
not that requirement is a prerequisite to filing -.=-::·· for 
any citizen to file a petition for this Court for mandamus. 
That's all. 
.· 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mattox. Mr. Ward, 
you may answer both of these gentlemen. 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, as far as the expeditious 
hearing, if they followed these proceedings: posted a bond, 
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1 we could have been here a long time ago. We wouldn't be 
2 here. All they had to do was give a letter to the Board 
3 of Supervisors, tell them that they are dissatisfied. They 
4 intend to sue. ~hey post a bond. They sue under the Code 
5 section we'd have been here two, six, eight months ago. 
6 The reason for the delay is not our fault. 
7 They. didn't comply with the law. 
8 Now, the plaintiffs' attorney has set forth 
9 in his argument the Dominion case. As I stated previously, 
IO we feel that the law is any claims or demands except for 
II those which have been carved out as exception by the 
I2 Supreme Court or by the General Assembly; and before they 
13 get to that portion in their ar~ument, states ·that 15.1-554 
I4 deals with damages generally including the composition, 
15 responsibilities, 'powers of the Board of Supervisors of 
16 a County. 
17 The statute relates to general claims, demands 
18 against the County arising out of transactions, disputes 
I9 and matters incident to the operation of ~he County by the 
20 Board. This section does not specifically provide for the 
21 correction of erroneous assessment. It does not. There's 
22 a specific code section, I said that in my argument; and 
IS ~ 23 they have stated that only cases that we've cited today 
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deal with monetary or contract terms. The only cases they 
see that they cited, Your Honor, had one common thread, 
every one of them deals with a diversion of funds in some 
nature on the inability of the Board of Supervisors to pay 
certain funds. That's what they're basing their 
equitable jurisdiction on. 
We feel that's not proper. We also feel that 
this is an indirect manner in which to claim money 
and compensation for the County. We plead it. Judge, I 
feel like, and I don't mean to make· light of it, I feel 
like Don Quixote fightingwindmills. I've been fighting 
Hummel airport for the last seven years. Every Board of 
Supervisors meetings. This is not the first suit we've 
had. We had a suit in Richmond brought by the same 
individuals. It was dismissed because one of theparties 
never authorized it. It was mysteriously dismissed. 
We're here to~ay on another suit. Two of the 
parties have also dropped out. We're here with the same 
individual. 
It's our belief that they did contend and 
presume and wanted money from the Board of Supervisors. 
As authority for that I have in my hand a copy of an extract 
of a Board of Supervisors minutes of June 30 in which Mr. n~hi gs 
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1 really addressed the issue at that time, and it states, 
2 " .... That's a lot of exercise to go through only to force 
3 you to the issue of whether or not you're going to condemn 
4 Mr. Nuckols's property and other property or lose the 
5 airport. That's what I'm saying to you. You've made him 
6 go through a lot of steps, gone through a lot of there's 
7 a blank -- to address what Mr. Wa+d says is really the 
8 chief issue and that is what are you going to do with the 
9 airport? Are you going to keep it there or are you going 
10 to condemn the property?" 
11 . I know there have been statements made about 
12 the use of these windmills. They're going to be for 
13 saving electricity, but we feel that the truth is that 
14 they have been forcing the Cbunty to either shut the airport 
15 down or condemn their property; and we would submit this 
16 right now as evidence, Your Honor. 
17 MR. MATTOX: Your Honor, I have to interpose 
18 one view 
19 THE COURT: Well, now, Mr. Mattox 
20 'l MR. MATTOX: Mr. Ward, Your Honor 
21 THE COURT: I set some rules of argument here. 
22 I stated that Mr. Ward would open and you gentlemen would 
. , 23 reply each. Any objection to his making a statement, Mr. 
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1 Ward? 
2 MR. WARD: No, sir. 
3 THE COURT: All right, sir. 
4 MR. MATTOX: Mr. Ward went completely beyond 
5 at pleadings in this case at this moment. There's not 
6 one word in these pleadings about Hummel Airport, Your 
7 Honor. Not any place. Anc what Mr. Ward has to say about 
8 Hummel Airport is completely out of character. 
9 MR. WARD: I feel these people have brought up 
10 today they're dealing with Hummel Airport. These people hav~~ 
11 brought up today the condemnation. That wasn't brought up 
12 previously. That's the only reason I submitted this 
13 extract of the minutes to prove that. It was·that that 
14 was in their mind, and that was in the mind of their 
15 attorney on June 30th when he made the statement; and we 
16 do feel that that's an indirect manner in which he's 
17 trying to obtain·-~ 
18 MR. MATTOX: No evidence of that, Your Honor. 
19 No evidence before this Court of that. 
20 MR. WARD: Judge, that's -- I'm just going 
21 by what's in his --
22 THE COURT: Sir, I didn't hear. 
. ,. 23 MR. WARD: I'm just basing my argument on the 
• ! 
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MR. CUMMINGS: Your Honor please, you may 
recall we were here on March, whatever day it was in 
March, Your Honor asked Mr. Ward whatever exhibits he 
wanted to put into the record, Your Honor, should be 
submitted with his motion, his brief; and he submitted 
several things with that motion, with that brief; and I 
would object as Mr. Mattox did to the inclusion of this. 
First of all it's an extract taken out of context. Second 
of all it's not at all in compliance with Your Honor's 
instruction. Whatever he wanted to put in to put in there. 
THE COURT: Do you object to that being put in? 
MR. CUMMINGS: We have no way to respond. I do 
object to it being put in. 
THE COURT: The Court will sustain the 
objection. Carry it back to Mr. Ward, please. 
Gentlemen, I'll be very brief. One sentence 
with my ruling in this matter. 
In my opinion in this matter the law of the 
.. 
Commonwealth of Virginia demands that I sustain the motion 
brought forward here on behalf of the Board of Supervisors. 
Mr. Ward, the Court will require you to prepare the order 
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1 in this matter, submit it to those gentlemen for their 
2 signature. 
3 MR. WARD: I'll be more than happy. 
4 THE COURT: Court thanks you gentlemen. 
5 Particularly I t~ank you for the briefs you gentlemen 
6 have submitted. I know you put a lot of work in this. 
7 The Court wants to thank you. It's been a great help. 
8 Thank you all the officers consideration in the hearing 
9 today and in the past. 
10 MR. CUMMINGS: Your Honor, in light of the 
11 briefs that were submitted and the extensive argument, I 
12 wonder if the Court would be able to elaborate on the 
13 reasons so that we have that pa;t of the record as to what 
14 issues the Court felt rationale so that in the event we 
15 might want to consider some further action because it is 
16 a matter I think, Your Honor, where clearly we think very 
17 strongly distressing. 
18 What the Court is saying in effect that the 
19 power of this Court to issue an injunction set forth 
20 MR. WARD: Judge, I would have to object to 
21 this. If he wants to elaborate 
22 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
I • 23 MR. WARD: But he's arguing his case. 
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1 MR. CUMMINGS: I'm just asking. I think the 
2 matter --
3 MR. WARD: He can as for elaboration without 
4 rearguing his case. 
5 THE COURT: Well, gentlemen, I feel like that 
6 is the law of th~ State of Virginia, the statute law and 
7 the case law·. How this case has been brought about I 
8 believe. The title I have before me, I have Title 15.1 before 
9 me. I have the caselaw before me that you gentlemen have 
10 submitted in the briefs. I've read both of them. I've 
11 gone through them, and I feel like because of the pleadings 
12 brought forward -- I say the pleadings, and I would say 
13 I didn't want to say that, but ~will say it, ~ think 
14 because of the way the pleadings have been brought forward 
15 and also that the law of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
16 that I have to sustain the motion. 
17 MR. CUMMINGS: Only reason I ask Your Honor I 
18 don't mean to_reargue the case--
19 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
20 MR. CUMMINGS: But because 8.01-191 which is 
21 the statute which gives the Court authority of mandamus 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Cummings, you must know --
23 MR. CUMMINGS: would appear to be in conflict 
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with 15.1-552 because there's no restrictive language about 
the -- in 8.01 about the Court's power to issue a 
mandamus. As Mr. Mattox and I said, that's all the Court 
has to consider today, and I just wanted the Court --
I understand the ~ourt's saying that you feel 15.1-552 
overrides 8.01. 
THE COURT: I feel that way. I feel this way 
also I think you're asking for monetary damages. I think 
in your ~leadings, you've asked for it and so forth, and 
maybe I wasn't at the hearing, but your statement is here; 
but before the Board of Supervisors you say the land may be 
condemned and so forth. I didn't -- I mean you did 
ask me for my reasons. 
MR. CUMMINGS: Count III, Your Honor, is out of 
the case now. That's why ~e took Count III out to avoid 
that possibility the Court might still think that. 
THE COURT: Didn't I ask you what you were 
trying to do directly, indirectly? 
MR. CUMMINGS: I'm saying absoL~tely not, Your 
Honor. I think on the matter of law, Your Honor, there was 
a basic irregularity in the refusal to issue the ~ermits. 
MR. WARD: Judge, he's arguing his case, and 
I would object to --
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1 MR. CUMMINGS: That's why we brought this 
2 mandamus action. 
3 MR. WARD: I don't care why he brought it. 
4 THE COURT: I've ruled and I feel lik~ in my 
5 humble opinion,! may be wrong, but I feel like I've ruled 
6 correctly. 
7 MR. CUMMINGS: I'm not arguing with Your 
8 Honor's -- with the fact Your Honor has that sentiment. 
9 I'm just trying to clarify the record the reasons for it. 
10 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
11 MR. CUMMINGS: And I appreciate Your Honor 
12 taking the few minutes to elaborate on that because it is 
13 an issue. If Your Honor feels that 8.01 is superceded by, 
14 overriden by 15.1-552, that's the issue I think only the 
15 Supreme Court can resolve because there's no language in 
16 8.01 about mandamus which says you have to go through any 
U extra drill or through acJ extra steps going back to the 
18 County. 
19 THE COURT: I will answer it=this way, we're 
20 all bound by rules of Court. I think if you look for 
21 rules of Supreme Court, so many of them are based on time 
22 elements. We go to the District Court, to Juvenile Court 
23 what you .have to do in a 10 day period to appeal your case. 
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When you appeal from the Circuit Court, the Supreme Court 
of Virginia, you have to do something. The statutes are 
most of t.hem are based.-ona time element, and we do not 
comply with those time elements, we're lost; and we've got 
to work on some system and the laws or we're lost; and 
we'd be in chaos, and I 
MR. CUMMINGS: If that's Your Honor's feeling, 
there's absolutely nothing in the mandamus statute which 
has any precatory effort has to be taken by a party 
aggrieved 
THE COURT: All right, gentlemen. I've ruled 
on the matter, and I feel like I've done properly; and, of 
course, you have the right of a~peal to the Supreme Court. 
At this time, the Court would order that the 
transcript be made a part of the record. That would save 
you time corning back another time. 
MR. CUMMINGS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon at approximately 11:39 o'clock a.m., 
the hearing in the above-~~tter was conc~uded.) 
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 
I, Sharon A. Opachko, the stenographic reporter 
who was duly sworn to well and truly report the foregoing 
proceedings, do hereby certify that they are true and 
correct to the best of my knowledge and ability; and that 
I have no interest in said proceedings, financial or 
otherwise, nor through relationship with any of the parties 
in interest of their counsel. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
this 11th day of June, 1984. 
Registered 
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V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 




v. ) IN CHANCERY NO. 2276 
) 
T. BOOKER MOORE, Successor to ) 
WILLIAM FOSTER, Building Official ) 





BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF ) 




This cause came on to be heard on June 6, 1984 on the 
pleadings heretofore filed, upon the bill of complaint and 
amended bill of complaint filed by the complainants, upon the 
demurrer filed by the defendants, upon the motion to dismiss 
filed by the defendants, upon th~ order substituting T. Booker 
Moore for William Foster as a party defendant, upon the order 
non-suiting complainants, Marshall D. and Nancy M. Beard and 
Bernard L. and Pansy M. Fletcher, upon the order non-suiting 
Count III of the amended complaint, upon the.~omplainants' 
memorandum of law in opposition to defendant~· motion to dismiss, 
and upon argument of counsel, and it 
APPEARING TO THE COURT that sections 15.1-550 through 15.1-
554 of the Virginia Code requiring that certain procedural steps 
82 
-· 
be followed before bringing a suit against a county must be 
complied with before a Court of Equity can entertain an applica-
tion for tl~ issuance of a writ of mandamus under Sections 8.01-
644 through 8.01-653 of the Virginia Code or an application for 
declaratory judgment under Se6tions 8.01-184 through 8·.01-191 of 
the Virginia Code, and it further 
APPEARING TO THE COURT that the complainants, in Count I of 
their amended bill of complaint, are seeking a writ of mandamus, 
pursuant to Sections 8.01-644 through 8.01-653 of the Virginia 
Code, to order the Middlesex County Building Official to issue 
them a building permit, and that the complainants in Count II of 
their amended bill of complaint are seeking a declaratory 
judgment pursuant to Sections 8.01-184 through 8.01-191 of the 
Virginia Code, but that the complainants have not complied with 
the procedural requi~ernents of Sections 15.1-550, et seq., of 
the Virginia Code, and that the motion to dismiss should 
accordingly be granted, 
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is 
ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED that the amended bill of 
complaint shall be and the same hereby is dismissed, and it is 
further 
ORDERED that the transcript of this preceding shall be made 
a part of the record, and it is further 
ORDERED that the Clerk shall forthwith send a certified 
copy of this decree to each counsel of record. 
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Assignments of Error 
The lower court erred in ruling that the procedural 
requirements established for the presentation of claims 
or demands against a county as set out in §§15.1-550 et seq., 
of the Code of Virginia, regulate the filing of a petition 
for a declaratory judgment to declare a county ordinance 
either inapplicable under a "grandfather clause" or null 
and void ab initio. 
The lower court erred in ruling that the procedural 
requirements established for the presentation of claims 
or demands against a county as set out in §§15.1-550 et seq.,l 
--- I 
of the Code of Virginia, regulate the filing of a petition ! 
for a writ of mandamus to order a county official to I 
fulfill his official duty. 
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